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This article investigates the impact of military spending changes on economic
growth in China over the period 1953 to 2010. Using two-stateMarkov-switching
speciﬁcations, the results suggest that the relationship between military spending
changes and economic growth is state dependent. Speciﬁcally, the results show
that military spending changes affect the economic growth negatively during a
slower growth–higher variance state, while positively within a faster growth–
lower variance one. It is also demonstrated that military spending changes contain
information about the growth transition probabilities. As a policy tool, the results
indicate that increases in military spending can be detrimental to growth during
slower growth–higher growth volatility periods.
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I. Introduction
Over the last few decades there has been a considerable
attention on the macroeconomic effects of military spend-
ing from both policy makers and academics alike. The
general argument is that any potential change in the
defence spending will affect economic growth in an econ-
omy (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Dunne, 1996, for
a detailed analysis). More speciﬁcally, the linkages
between military spending and economic growth can be
summarized by two main theoretical views. The
Keynesian income multiplier effect posits that military
spending affects economic growth positively, whereas
crowding-out hypothesis favours a negative growth
impact of military spending.
In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by
examining regime switching in the relationship between
military spending changes and economic growth in China
over the period 1953 to 2010. Given the rise of China as
global economic and military major power, the linkage
between its military spending and economic growth has
drawn much attention over the recent years (see Dimitraki
and Menla Ali, 2013, for a comprehensive review).1 Most
of the existing empirical studies have assumed linear
dependence and constant parameters (e.g. Chen, 1993;
Masih et al., 1997; Wolde-Rufael, 2001, among others),
*Corresponding author. E-mail: faek.menlaali@brunel.ac.uk
1Dimitraki and Menla Ali (2013) found that military spending is driven by the economic development in the long run in China. In this
article, we examine whether military spending changes have any short-run dynamic impact on growth or not. This is also in line with what
is known as the ﬁscal multiplier effect of military spending (see Hall, 2009, for a thorough theoretical and empirical discussion).
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which is not the case since the Chinese economic system
underwent structural changes in the light of the policy
reforms undertaken since 1978. Indeed, China has
observed unprecedented episodes of economic growth
over the last few years. The Chinese economy has been
growing at an annual rate of 9.7% over the period 1978 to
2010 as opposed to 6.4% during 1953–1977.2
Although a number of studies have provided evidence
for the nonlinear relationship between military spending
and growth (e.g. Stroup and Heckelman, 2001; Aizenman
and Glick, 2006; Kalaitzidakis and Tzouvelekas, 2011,
among others), the nonlinear dependence between these
two variables with reference to China has drawn less
attention. The only exception is the study by Lai et al.
(2005), who examined the arms race between China and
Taiwan, and using a multivariate threshold regression they
found that defence spending leads the Chinese economic
growth only in one regime (when Taiwan’s spending
growth is less than 5%).
Considering the recent evidence of Lai et al. (2005) on
nonlinear dependence, this article uses the Markov regime-
switching model as an alternative way to examine the non-
linear relation between military spending changes and eco-
nomic growth in China. To the best of our knowledge, the
regime-switching relationship between the two variables
has not been explored in the literature yet. The existence
of multiple growth regimes and parameter heterogeneity
has been widely known by now. The multiple steady states
and growth regimes have been attributed mainly to the
dynamics of business cycles (e.g. Hamilton, 1989) and
also to the presence of what is known as sizable spillovers
(e.g. Azariadis and Drazen, 1990).
The chosen econometricmodel will enable us to examine
the impact of military spending changes on economic
growth in two states of growth by allowing the data them-
selves to identify these states. That is, when the economic
growth is fast/slow and when the growth exhibits high/low
volatility. Intuitively, military spending budgets may not be
the same during expansionary and recessionary periods and
also when the growth is highly volatile and less volatile. In
fact, there is now evidence that military spending changes
with the dynamics of economic growth. All major eco-
nomic powers, including the United States, the United
Kingdom, the European Union and China, have set public
investment programmes in order to counter the global
recession of 2007–2008 (Custers, 2010). Furthermore,
Wood (2010) reports that the economic basis of the military
spending ﬂuctuation in China ismainly due to the dynamics
of GDP. Also, the Chinese decisions related to the alloca-
tion of resources on defence were based, among other
factors, on its economic performance (e.g. improved eco-
nomic performance allows the expansion of the military
spending) and the timing of its various 5-year economic
plans (e.g. 1953–1957, 1958–1962, 1966–1970, 1971–
1975, 1976–1980, 1981–1985 and so on) (Cusack and
Ward, 1981). In particular, during the period of the eco-
nomic plans, China was trading off the defence spending by
boosting investment or consumption to promote economic
growth. The military spending was increasing mainly at the
beginning of the economic plans, whilst the economic
resources were directed to socio-economic purposes after-
wards (which were promoted by the developmental plans)
(Cusack and Ward, 1981).
The adopted model will also provide us with inference
regarding the impact of military spending changes on the
transition probabilities associated with switching of
growth states. Knowledge of the regime-switching rela-
tion between military spending changes and economic
growth may provide important policy implications.
Policy makers can set appropriate policies with regard
to military and nonmilitary budgets, depending on the
state of the economy. For example, if military spending
has adverse effects on economic growth in a state of
recession or if military spending keeps growth in the
recessionary state, expansionary policies to boost the
economy could then be unsuccessful if military spending
is large. In addition, an economic boost may be deemed
by military spending cutbacks or spending with due
consideration.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
Section II provides an overview of China’s growth and
defence policies. Section III reviews the theoretical and
empirical work on the linear and nonlinear relationship
between military spending and economic growth.
Section IV outlines the econometric methodology con-
ducted in the study. Section V describes the data and
discusses the empirical results, and ﬁnally Section VI
concludes.
II. An Overview of China’s Growth and
Defence Policies
The current renewed interest in China’s defence spending
and its military modernization requires shedding further
light on the relationship between military spending poli-
cies and strategies and economic growth in China. Even
though there were considerable changes in industry, infra-
structure and telecommunications, China did not com-
mence into a fast-rising economic growth before 1949 as
a result of ﬁscal weaknesses and a low rate of government
spending (approximately 9% in relation to national
income). However, the year 1949 was China’s actual turn-
ing point in the growth process due to a socio-economic
2Growth ﬁgures, sourced from China’s Statistical Yearbooks, are calculated by the authors.
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uprising.3 In addition, economic growth is a long-term
process that is based on the accumulation of capital (both
physical and human), along with the development of
institutions to support any sociopolitical and economic
changes (Richardson, 1999).
As far as China’s growth effects of military spending
are concerned, they were, in comparison to other nations,
not restricted to the production of weapons. Since 1949,
the People’s Liberation Army played a rather develop-
mental role in promoting economic growth via investment
in the military technology (and as an extent in the Chinese
military industry). Furthermore, since Mao’s developmen-
tal and military technology programmes, China’s funda-
mental policies were concentrated on both national
security and economic prosperity via what is known as
technological infusion (Feigenbaum, 1999).4 In particular,
China’s defence spending was mostly an assurance to
preserve national security and uphold the world peace.5
It follows that the Chinese military expenditures, espe-
cially the national investment policies towards the military
industry and the R&D, link the defence sector with the
Chinese developmental strategies (Feigenbaum, 1999).
For example, Marshal Nie Rongzhen (a Chinese defence
technical leader) argued that China should rely on the
defence industry (as part of the Chinese modernization
policy) not only due to security issues but explicitly the
military technology diffusion will boost China’s overall
economic growth (especially by fostering industrial inno-
vations and setting the basis for advanced technological
diligences) (Feigenbaum, 1999). Undoubtedly, the
Chinese economic development also depends on ﬁnancial
and trade ties with other countries, and China is likely not
to jeopardize such ties (Roy, 1994).
III. A Review of the Literature
The relationship between defence expenditure and eco-
nomic growth has become widely debated both theoreti-
cally and empirically. On the one hand, the transfer of
resources from the civilian to the military sector creates
the crowding-out effect, and on the other, the defence
sector provides positive externalities (especially in less
developed countries) through channels such as infra-
structure, human capital formation (e.g. education and
training) and technological advancements (Ram, 1995).
Another channel for the positive impact of military
spending stems from the fact that military spending
provides a country with security (both internally and
externally), which in turn attracts foreign investors, espe-
cially those of long-term investment plans (Sandler and
Hartley, 1995).
The empirical ﬁndings are also inconclusive. More
speciﬁcally, since Benoit’s (1978) seminal paper, who
found the existence of a positive relationship between
military expenditure and economic growth in developing
countries, there sparked a bulk of empirical research to
challenge his ﬁndings. The literature approached the issue
from different theoretical and methodological perspec-
tives, different periods and different applications in var-
ious geographical areas and commonalities (e.g. high–low
growth or nonconﬂict and conﬂict states).
While the impact of military expenditures on economic
growth in developing countries is found to be insigniﬁcant
(Deger and Sen, 1995), such an impact turns out to be
relatively stronger and negative in developed countries
(Kollias et al., 2007). All in all, the empirical studies
suggest that military expenditure is either positively (e.g.
Kusi, 1994, among others) or negatively related to growth
(e.g. Knight et al., 1996; Shieh et al., 2002, among others),
while others conclude that there is no discernible relation-
ship between the prolonged variables (e.g. Majeski, 1992;
Mintz and Stevenson, 1995, among others). The ﬁndings
with reference to China are also mixed as demonstrated in
a recent survey by Dimitraki and Menla Ali (2013) and
Table 1 which reports the existing empirical studies for
China.
Since these aforementioned studies have mainly
adopted linear methods in analysing the linkage between
military spending and economic growth, the ambiguity of
the ﬁndings of these studies may be due to the use of
different models (i.e. causality is a model-dependent set-
up, see Hendry and Ericsson, 1991), and the models may
be sensitive to the samples selected and nonlinearity may
also be important. Indeed, several empirical studies con-
cluded that nonlinearities are highly associated with ﬁscal
policy variables such as government expenditure, taxes,
the overall size of deﬁcit, etc. (see Barro, 1990; Giavazzi
et al., 2000). Furthermore, Pieroni (2009) argued that if
the nonlinearities are not statistically controlled for, any
relationship between military burden and economic
growth might be questionable as the correlation between
them might be wrongly speciﬁed, and thence erroneous
conclusions might be drawn.
3According to Naughton (2007), the increased strain on the living standards as a result of the increase in the population growth, the
absence of technological innovations, the danger of famine and diseases and mainly the uneven distribution of income were some of the
reasons that were lunging the existing socio-economic system.
4Those policies are known as ‘techno-nationalism’which identify further a direct link between military spending policies and a country’s
economic development mainly via the channel of investment (Feigenbaum, 1999).
5Naughton (2007) argued that China’s fundamental principle is to safeguard national security and harmony and guarantee progress of
building a developed society (e.g. to attract new investors as part of their development policies).
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Empirical studies on the nonlinear relationship between
military spending and economic growth include Stroup
and Heckelman (2001), Lai et al. (2005), Aizenman and
Glick (2006), Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2006) and Yang
et al. (2011), among others. To the best of our knowledge,
the only empirical study of the nonlinear relationship
between military spending and economic growth with
reference to China is the study by Lai et al. (2005) (see
Table 1). This article, by contrast, aims to provide a further
nonlinear evidence between the two variables in China
using the Markov-switching speciﬁcations.
IV. The Markov-Switching Model
In this study, we examine the nonlinear impact of military
spending changes on economic growth in China over the
period 1953 to 2010. The Markov regime-switching
Table 1. Review of the empirical literature of China’s defence spending-economic growth nexus
Author(s) Period Methodology Main ﬁnding(s)
Chen (1993) 1950–1991 (1) Engle and Granger (1987) two-
step cointegration
(2) Granger causality tests
(1) EG and Milex are not cointegrated
(2) No Granger causality between the two variables is
found in the short run
Masih et al. (1997) 1950–1991 (1) Johansen (1995) cointegration
(2) Granger causality tests
(1) EG and Milex are cointegrated
(2) Causality runs from Milex to EG
Sun and Yu (1999) 1965–1993 OLS regression (1) China’s GNP affects Milex
(2) The results are robust irrespective of using ofﬁcial
Chinese or Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency data
Chang et al. (2001) 1952–1995 (1) Johansen (1995) cointegration
(2) Granger causality tests
(1) China’s national income and Milex are not
cointegrated
(2) Causality from EG to Milex changes is found in
the short run
Wolde-Rufael
(2001)
1950–1991 (1) A series of unit root tests
(2) Granger causality tests
(1) EG and Milex are not integrated of the same order
(2) Causality runs from Milex changes to EG
Lai et al. (2005) 1953–2000 Multivariate threshold regression (1) Arms race is found between Taiwan and China
(2) China’s Milex changes lead EG in only one regime
(when Taiwan’s spending growth is less than 5%)
Bing-Fu and
Liming (2006)
1960–1999 OLS regression (1) Lagged Milex, GDP and changes in the strategic
environment are major determinants of China’s
Milex
(2) Economic factors, the national security environ-
ment and lagged Milex are the primary determin-
ing factors of Milex prior to 1981
(3) Lagged Milex affects Milex after 1981
Pradhan (2010) 1988–2007 (1) Johansen (1995) cointegration
(2) Granger causality tests
(1) GDP, Milex and public debt are cointegrated
(2) Causality from Milex changes to EG was detected
in the short run
Bo and Xing (2011) 1953–2007 Granger causality tests (1) No causality is found between Milex changes and
EG
(2) Causality from Milex changes to EG is only found
for the period 1989 to 2007 using China’s ofﬁcial
data, but not for Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute data
Chang et al. (2013) 1988–2010 Bootstrap panel causality approach Causality from real GDP to Milex is found for China
Meng et al. (2013) 1989–2012 (1) Engle and Granger (1987) two-
step cointegration
(2) Granger causality tests
(1) Milex and income inequality are cointegrated
(2) Causality from Milex changes to those of income
inequality is found in the short run
Dimitraki and
Menla Ali (2013)
1952–2010 (1) Bartlett corrected trace test for
cointegration
(2) Long-run weak exogeneity tests
(1) Cointegration is found between Milex and real
GDP along with some control variables
(2) It is the economic development that drives
increases in Milex
Note: EG and Milex denote economic growth and military spending, respectively.
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model developed by Hamilton (1989, 1990) is particularly
appropriate to examine the economic growth in different
regimes. More speciﬁcally, economic growth is allowed to
be shifted in the mean and the variance, that is, for periods
of expansion and contraction and high volatility and low
volatility.6 The model is speciﬁed as follows:
yt ¼ μst þ
X2
i¼1
fi yti þ βst xt1 þ λ0 zt1 þ εt;
εt , Nð0;σ2s tÞ
(1)
where yt and xt denote respectively the economic growth and
changes inmilitary spending and εt is a white noise term. zt–1
is a vector of control variables proposed in the growth
literature7 (e.g. Barro, 1990), namely nondefence spending
changes,8 government investment changes,9 population
growth and human capital changes with coefﬁcients λ1; λ2;
λ3 and λ4, respectively.
10 Autoregressive terms (up to two
lags)11 are also considered in case there is persistence, if any,
in the conditional mean of economic growth.
Since yt is being modelled as conditional normal, the
mean, μst , the variance, σ
2
s t
, and the slope of military spend-
ing changes, βst , depend on the state st, st 2 f1 ; 2g, which
is in operation. The nonobservable state variable st is
assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process with con-
stant transition probabilities speciﬁed as follows:
pij ¼ Pr ðst ¼ j j st1 ¼ iÞ (2)
where the probability of being in state j based on the
information on the whole series will be referred to as the
smoothed probability, Pr ðst ¼ j j y1; ::::; yT Þ. In order to
check the sensitivity of the identiﬁed regimes to the exo-
genous variables (e.g. military spending changes and con-
trol variables), we also estimate Equation 1 without any
exogenous variables.
Furthermore, to examine whether military spending
changes provide any inference about the transition prob-
abilities associated with switching between growth states,
we also allow these transition probabilities to be time
varying (see Filardo, 1994). In particular, rather than
examining the impact of military spending changes, xt–1,
on economic growth directly, as speciﬁed in Equation 1,
we allow these transition probabilities to depend on xt–1
instead.12 That is, the growth transition probabilities are
speciﬁed as follows:
P11t ¼
expfγ0 þ γ1xt1g
1þ expfγ0 þ γ1xt1g
;
P22t ¼
expfη0 þ η1xt1g
1þ expfη0 þ η1xt1g
:
(3)
Note that if an increase in military spending leads to an
increase in the probability of staying in state 1, one would
anticipate γ1> 0. On the other hand, η1< 0 indicates that an
increase in military spending results in a decrease in the
probability of staying in state 2.
The model estimation is conducted by maximum like-
lihood using the expectation maximization algorithm
described by Hamilton (1989, 1990). Furthermore, for
comparison purposes, several constant parameter models
are also estimated using OLS. Such models have been
frequently estimated in the literature and may take the
following forms:
A model without exogenous variables:
yt ¼ μþ
X2
i¼1
fi yti þ εt; εt , Nð0;σ2Þ (4)
A model with military spending changes only:
yt ¼ μþ
X2
i¼1
fi yti þ βxt1 þ εt; εt , Nð0;σ2Þ
(5)
A model with military spending changes and control
variables:
yt ¼ μþ
X2
i¼1
fi yti þ βxt1 þ λ0 zt1 þ εt;
εt , Nð0;σ2Þ
(6)
6Hamilton (1989) and Arin and Spagnolo (2011), among many others, have shown that the Markov regime-switching model is
particularly appropriate for modelling the growth states, while similar ﬁndings were found by Smith et al. (2000) for military
expenditures.
7 There are a number of variables affecting economic growth (see Levine and Renelt, 1992, for a thorough discussion). This article
follows recommendations made by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) for the most common variables that affect
economic growth and widely used in the growth literature.
8Defence plus nondefence spending constitute government consumption.
9Government investment is the variable ‘ci’ from PWT 7.1 and is deﬁned (in PWT 7.1) as ‘Investment Share of PPP Converted GDP Per
Capita at current prices %’.
10By doing so, our underlying theoretical model follows the Barro style growth model derived from Barro (1990) and adjusted by
Devarajan et al. (1996) to take into account military and nonmilitary spending.
11 Following the London School of Economics approach to econometrics, we check autocorrelations up to 2 years dynamics, hence two
observations in our case.
12Note that the impact of military spending changes on the growth transition probabilities is estimated by keeping the growth-control
variables in Equation 1.
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More details on the estimation process of the models
described above and the data are given in the Section V.
V. Data Description and Empirical Results
The data used to estimate themodel are annual observations
for China over the period 1953 to 2010 and were retrieved
from the following sources. Economic growth of real GDP,
population (in millions), nondefence spending and military
expenditures are from China’s Statistical Yearbooks, while
the data for government investment and human capital are
from the PennWorld Tables.13 For robustness purposes, the
results are also estimated using real GDP growth from Penn
World Tables (version 8.0).14
Table 2 reports a summary of descriptive statistics of the
relevant variables: military spending changes and eco-
nomic growth. The annual mean of economic growth in
China is positive (8%), whilst the corresponding mean for
military spending changes is negative (−3%). With regard
to volatility, economic growth exhibits lower volatility (by
two and a half times) than military spending changes.
Furthermore, the two variables exhibit strong excess kur-
tosis and skewness. The Jarque–Bera (JB) test statistics
show that normality is rejected at the 1% level for both
variables.
In order to examine the time-series properties of the
relevant variables, we run the more powerful unit root test
of Elliott et al. (1996) which modiﬁes the Dickey-Fuller
test using generalized least squares (DF-GLS). Also, the
minimum Lagrange multiplier (LM) unit root test of Lee
and Strazicich (2004) with one structural break in the
intercept and the trend is reported. The latter is likely to
be instructive as the time series under examination involve
the Chinese policy reforms in the early 1980s. Unlike the
Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test with a single
endogenous structural break, the LM test is known to
have no size distortion and spurious rejections in the
presence of a break under the null hypothesis.15 The
results, as displayed in Table 3, show that both military
Table 3. Unit root test results
Military spending changes Economic growth
Panel A: DF-GLS tests
Without trend −2.432(4)** −2.243(4)**
With trend −2.881(4) −4.844(4)***
Panel B: One-break LM tests
Statistic −10.510 (0)**** −8.278 (2)***
TB [1973]
s [1970]s
λ λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5
Notes: The 1% and 5% critical values for the DF-GLS test are
respectively −2.608 and −1.946 (without trend) and −3.754 and
−3.177 (with the trend). The lag length, represented in parenth-
eses, is selected on the basis of the modiﬁed Akaike information
criterion for the DF-GLS tests and the general-to-speciﬁc
approach for the LM tests with a single break. The estimated
breakpoints TB for the single-break LM tests are in square brack-
ets, with s indicating that the identiﬁed breakpoint is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. Critical values for the minimum one-break LM
unit root test allowing for a shift in intercept and change in trend
slope (Model C) for a sample of T = 100 are displayed below,
which depend (to some extent) on the location of the breakpoint
(λ = (TB/T) where T is the sample size) and are symmetric around
λ and (1 – λ).
***indicates signiﬁcance at 1% and ** at 5%.
Break point location Critical values
λ = (TB/T) 1% 5%
0.1 –5.11 –4.50
0.2 –5.07 –4.47
0.3 –5.15 –4.45
0.4 –5.05 –4.50
0.5 –5.11 –4.51
Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics
Mean SD Skewness Excess kurtosis JB
Economic growth 0.083 0.071 −2.152 11.372 210.47***
Military spending changes −0.031 0.186 0.260 10.200 123.79***
Notes: JB is the Jarque–Bera test for normality.
***denotes signiﬁcance at 1%.
13Version 7.1 of Penn World Tables is used to obtain government investment, whereas human capital is retrieved from version 8.0.
14 See Waller (1997), Wang (1999) and Orlik (2012) for a thorough discussion related to the reliability and reasons for variances of the
Chinese data; Bing-Fu and Liming (2006) for a discussion about overestimates of the Chinese data fromWestern mainstream and issues
with exchange rates; Sun and Yu (1999) who state that differences in sources might be systematic but are still qualitatively the same; Bo
and Xing (2011) for a discussion of the differences in statistical methodology and the institution of the defence system between China and
Western mainstream and Dunne (1996) for a thorough explanation that there should be no concern for the source of origin for data used in
time-series analysis as long as their deﬁnitions do not change signiﬁcantly.
15 The endogenous breakpoint in the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test is chosen where a one-sided test statistic on the coefﬁcient in the ADF
test is minimized (i.e. the most negative). Hence, such test favours to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for a trend stationary process
with a break.
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spending changes and economic growth are I(0) pro-
cesses. Figure 1 displays the annual time-series pattern
of economic growth and military spending changes over
the period 1953 to 2010. It is also evident from this ﬁgure
that the two series are covariance stationary.
The OLS as well as the maximum likelihood estimates
are reported in Table 4. Columns 1 and 4 report the
estimates of the two competing (linear and nonlinear)
models without the presence of any exogenous or control
variables, respectively. Columns 2 and 3 report the results
respectively after includingmilitary spending changes only,
as in Equation 5, and military spending changes along with
control variables, as in Equation 6. Furthermore, while
column 5 reports the results of the Markov-switching rela-
tion between military spending changes and economic
growth including control variables and assuming ﬁxed
transition probabilities, as in Equation 1, column 6 lists
the results of the time-varying transition probability
Markov-switching model of the relation between military
spending changes and economic growth, as in Equation 3,
including also the growth-control variables.
The linearity hypothesis against the Markov-switching
alternative cannot be tested using a standard likelihood ratio
test as the parameters of the second state are not determined
under the null of a single-state model. Garcia (1998) derives
the asymptotic critical values for Hansen’s (1992) test for
several two-state Markov-switching models. The 1% criti-
cal value of the likelihood ratio statistic for the considered
two-state Markov models is less than 17.38. In the case at
hand, the likelihood ratio statistic, calculated from the mod-
els in columns 1 and 4, is 45.52, which is well above the
critical value and indicates the signiﬁcance of the second
state. The nonlinear structure in the economic growth is also
conﬁrmed by Tsay (1986) test (see Table 4).
The OLS results in column 2 indicate that changes in
military spending have a negative impact on the eco-
nomic growth of China. After extending the growth
regression with the control variables in column 3, the
above impact remains negative but becomes weak (sig-
niﬁcant at the 12% level). This evidence is in contrast to
Chen (1993), who found no causality between military
spending and economic growth in China and also, oppo-
site to Masih et al. (1997) and Lai et al. (2005), who
estimated a positive effect. Among the control variables,
only population growth appears to exert a positive effect
on growth.
To obtain further insights into the form of the relationship
between military spending changes and economic growth,
we estimate a moving window to the OLS regression spe-
ciﬁed in Equation 5 (column 2). We select a window length
equal to 3 years.16 The estimated constant and slope coefﬁ-
cient of military spending changes with their corresponding
SEs are displayed in Fig. 2. The graphical analysis indicates
that both the intercept and the slope coefﬁcient evolve
signiﬁcantly over time, conﬁrming that the relation between
economic growth and military spending changes is non-
linear. Hence, the relation between the two variables
requires modelling by using a nonlinear speciﬁcation. The
Markov-switching model applied in this study is particu-
larly useful and advantageous to other nonlinear speciﬁca-
tions such as threshold regression and break analyses.
When using break models, it is assumed that every break
is permanent, which is not the case because of the dynamics
of the business cycles. With regard to threshold regression
analysis, Pieroni (2009, p. 332), in a recent paper, com-
ments that ‘the threshold at which the nonlinearities
between military spending and economic growth occur is
largely variable and depends on the country-speciﬁc per-
ception about uncertainty’.
The results of the ﬁxed as well as the time-varying
transition probability two-state Markov-switching models
(columns 5 and 6 of Table 4) allowing for a shift in the
mean and the variance also indicate that the relationship
between military spending changes and economic growth
is state dependent. The estimated models are shown to be
well deﬁned: the standardized residuals exhibit no signs of
linear or nonlinear dependence. The parameters of the
mean and the variance are signiﬁcant, and hence the
periods of fast/slow economic growth and of high/low
growth volatility seem to be accurately identiﬁed by the
smoothed probabilities. The null hypotheses of H0:
μ1 ¼ μ2 and H0: σ1 ¼ σ2 are clearly rejected at any
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
–0.5
0.0
0.5
Economic growth 
Military spending changes 
Fig. 1. Economic growth and military spending changes in China over the period 1953 to 2010
16 The results are also conﬁrmed by using a window length equal to 5 years. These results are available upon request.
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conventional signiﬁcance level; hence the shifts in both
the mean and the variance are justiﬁed.
Using both ﬁxed and time-varying transition probabil-
ity Markov-switching models (columns 5 and 6), it
appears that state one (two) is characterized by slow
(fast) economic growth and high (low) growth volatility
in the Chinese economy, corresponding to changes in
trends and volatility over the sample period, as well as to
the dynamics of business cycles rather than the long-term
changes in the growth rates. Figure 3 shows the plot for the
economic growth, yt, smoothed probabilities, military
spending changes, xt, and the time-varying transition
probability of the low growth–high variance state (state 1).
More speciﬁcally, the results of the ﬁxed transition
probability model (column 5) indicate that the probability
of staying in state one (two) is 0.72 (0.87). The smoothed
probabilities show a relatively low number of switches,
consistent with the high persistence in the two states.
There are 17 years (29.82%) where the process is in the
ﬁrst state and 40 years (70.18%) where the process is in the
Table 4. Linear and Markov-switching models (GDP growth source: China's Statistical Yearbooks)
One-state Two-state
OLS Extended OLS FTP Extended FTP Extended TVTP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
μ1 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.035 0.032** –0.022* –0.026**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.041) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011)
μ2 0.040*** 0.078*** 0.065***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.011)
f1 0.365** 0.599** 0.574** 0.569*** 0.297** 0.307**
(0.124) (0.239) (0.214) (0.105) (0.106) (0.136)
β1 –0.102** –0.080 –0.223***
(0.047) (0.050) (0.065)
β2 0.070**
(0.026)
λ1 –0.037 –0.071* –0.016
(0.096) (0.039) (0.060)
λ2 –0.122 0.025 –0.006
(0.107) (0.040) (0.054)
λ3 2.300* 2.858** 2.896**
(1.170) (1.529) (0.695)
λ4 –0.025 –0.019 –0.029
(0.029) (0.012) (0.021)
σ1 0.068 0.065 0.065 0.082*** 0.057*** 0.082**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
σ2 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.018**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
γ0 2.686**
(1.114)
γ1 5.300**
(2.332)
η0 2.482***
(0.833)
η1 3.376
(7.260)
p11 0.975*** 0.726***
(0.024) (0.116)
p21 0.013 0.124*
(0.021) (0.063)
LogLike 73.29 75.665 78.63 96.05 102.699 106.214
Q(2) 2.413[0.120] 2.393[0.121] 1.620[0.203] 2.536 [0.111] 0.489 [0.484] 1.487 [0.222]
ARCH(2) 0.500[0.774] 2.033[0.141] 0.599[0.552] 0.135 [0.874] 0.189 [0.827] 0.022 [0.977]
Tsay test 6.619[0.000]
Notes: FTP and TVTP denote ﬁxed and time-varying transition probability Markov-switching models, respectively. Q(2) is a
Portmanteau test of serial correlation up to order 2. ARCH(2) is an ARCH test up to order 2. SEs are in parentheses, while p-values
are reported in square brackets.
***denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
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1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
–0.2
0.0
0.2
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.5
1.0
P[Regime 1] smoothed
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
–0.5
0.0
0.5
Military spending changes
Time varying transition probability of state 1
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.5
1.0
Economic growth
Fig. 3. Economic growth, smoothed probabilities, military spending changes and the time-varying transition probability of the
low growth–high variance state (state 1)
1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
–0.20
–0.05
0.10
0.25
1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
–6
–4
–2
0
2
Fig. 2. The estimated constant (upper panel) and slope coefﬁcient associated with military spending changes (lower panel) from
moving window regression with SEs (in dotted lines) (window length is 3 years)
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second state (see Fig. 3). Furthermore, while the impact of
military spending changes on economic growth in state
one is negative, this impact turns out to be positive in state
two, enforcing the nonlinear dependence between the two
variables in China.
The negative impact associated with lower growth–
high variance state is consistent with the occurrence of
crowding-out effects, whereas the positive relationship in
the high growth–low variance state is consistent with the
Keynesian income multiplier effect. The latter effect has
been a widely used framework in the analysis of develop-
ing countries. The crowding-out effects suggest that an
increase in military expenditure is to be ﬁnanced either by
increasing current taxes or by borrowing, where the bal-
ance of payments deteriorates as a result of the latter.
Nonetheless, the spending, in either case, not only reduces
the expected after-tax return on productive capital, but
also the ﬂow of savings that is available for productive
capital, which in turn undermines the economic growth
(see Knight et al., 1996). The Keynesian income multi-
plier effect, on the other hand, posits that an increase in
military spending may boost aggregate domestic demand
capacity by inducing an increase in utilization (Dunne,
1996). Particularly, it increases the growth of current
production relative to full capacity production.
With regard to the control variables, nondefence spend-
ing changes are shown to have a negative impact on
growth using ﬁxed transition probabilities. Government
investment and human capital changes appear to exert
insigniﬁcant effects on growth. Finally, the impact of
population growth is positive and signiﬁcant, implying
that an increase in the labour force increases economic
growth (Mintz and Stevenson, 1995).
By considering the time-varying transition probability
Markov-switching model, the results (see column 6) sug-
gest that military spending changes also provide us with
some inference about the transition probabilities of
switching the two growth states, low growth–high var-
iance and high growth–low variance. The estimate of γ1 is
positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that an increase in
military spending increases the probability of remaining
in the low growth–high variance state (see Fig. 3). This
ﬁnding is also consistent with crowding-out effects dis-
cussed earlier. With regard to the control variables, only
population growth is shown to be signiﬁcant.
The above results are based on real GDP growth from
China’s Statistical Yearbooks. Using the corresponding
growth from the Penn World Table (version 8.0), the
results, as displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix, do not
exhibit much variability across the estimated models.
Overall, this indicates the robustness of the results dis-
cussed earlier.17
VI. Conclusions
In this article, we have examined the dynamic relationship
between economic growth and military spending changes
in China over the period 1953 to 2010. Our argument is
that the impact of military spending on economic growth
is different between periods of faster and slower growth as
well as between more and less volatile periods. Indeed, the
results presented herein show that the dynamic linkage
between military spending changes and economic growth
is state dependent. Using a ﬁxed transition probability
Markov-switching model, the empirical ﬁndings suggest
that military spending changes affect economic growth
negatively in a slower growth–high variance state (con-
sistent with crowding-out effects), whilst the effect is
positive in the fast growth–low variance one (consistent
with the Keynesian income multiplier effect).
Furthermore, the results of the time-varying transition
probability Markov-switching model show that military
spending changes also provide inference with regard to the
evolution of the transition probabilities across the high
growth–low variance and low growth–high variance
states. Speciﬁcally, it is shown that increases in military
spending keep economic growth in the lower growth–high
variance state, consistent also with crowding-out effects.
In a broad sense, these results indicate an important policy
implication in which an increase in military spending
hampers growth and affects the economy negatively dur-
ing slower growth–higher growth volatility periods.
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Appendix: Robustness results
Table A1. Linear and Markov-switching models (GDP growth source: PWT 8.0)
One state Two state
OLS Extended OLS FTP Extended FTP Extended TVTP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
μ1 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.030 0.029* –0.024** –0.029**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.030) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013)
μ2 0.061*** 0.069*** 0.060***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018)
f1 0.459*** 0.482*** 0.764*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.492***
(0.120) (0.115) (0.175) (0.133) (0.091) (0.134)
β1 –0.081** –0.052 –0.132***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.029)
β2 0.094**
(0.044)
λ1 –0.053 –0.061* –0.084**
(0.066) (0.030) (0.038)
λ2 –0.121 0.035 0.024
(0.075) (0.035) (0.039)
λ3 1.079 1.383*** 1.784***
(0.856) (0.412) (0.648)
λ4 –0.018 –0.023** –0.024
(0.021) (0.010) (0.015)
σ1 0.051 0.049 0.048 0.068*** 0.028*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011)
σ2 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
γ0 1.569**
(0.651)
γ1 10.839**
(5.088)
η0 0.214
(0.766)
η1 2.823
(3.148)
p11 0.960*** 0.473***
(0.039) (0.131)
p21 0.010 0.227***
(0.018) (0.075)
LogLike 89.42 92.12 95.67 103.31 111.88 114.216
Q(2) 0.557 [0.455] 0.382 [0.536] 0.081 [0.775] 1.142 [0.285] 0.256 [0.612] 0.449 [0.502]
ARCH(2) 0.381 [0.684] 2.689 [0.077] 0.142 [0.867] 0.036 [0.964] 0.180 [0.835] 0.216 [0.806]
Notes: FTP and TVTP denote ﬁxed and time-varying transition probability Markov-switching models, respectively. Q(2) is a
Portmanteau test of serial correlation up to order 2. ARCH(2) is an ARCH test up to order 2. SEs are in parentheses, while p-values
are reported in square brackets.
*** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
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